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Early this century, workers' compensation evolved as a more
satisfactory method of providing the occupationally injured worker with
wage-loss replacement and medical care than was permitted under the tort
system and employer's liability laws.
The new method offered the victims of work injuries and diseases
a system of "no fault" recovery of wage loss and medical treatment in
exchange for complete tort immunity for employers. This was done through
the designation of workers' compensation as an "exclusive remedy" for the
injured worker.
During the ensuing years workers' compensation was found to be
inadequate to provide benefits in situations that were not covered by this
remedial legislation. As a result, a gradual erosion of the exclusive-
remedy and immunity doctrines began to appear in the decisional law to cover
these cases.
The purpose of this discussion is to learn just how far these
doctrines have been eroded in order to provide additional remedies for
injured workers beyond workers' compensation.
Perhaps the term "erosion" is not precise, for as we shall see,
many of the injuries that now can be the subjects of tort claims against
the employer simply "fell through the cracks" in the compensation system,
and resulted in fact patterns where the worker suffered an injury but has
absolutely no remedy. It might be more precise to say that there has evolved
a clarification of the exclusive-remedy doctrine, rather than an erosion.
This article will also explore the development of allowable
additional recoveries for injured workers through third-party suits for
tort damages, directed against non-employer tortfeasors who were actually
responsible for the workers' injury.
Pennsylvania statutes and decisional law will be cited wherever
such local authority exists. However, workers' compensation is still an
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evolving system on a national basis. Thus, many interesting and in-
novative developments have occurred in other jurisdictions which will be
called to the readers' attention.
PENNSYLVANIA'S EXCLUSIVE-REMEDY DOCTRINE
Even before 1975, when Pennsylvania's compensation law was
elective, the exclusive-remedy doctrine limited the liability of the
employer. Section 303(a), Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, 77 P.S.
481(a), an amended version of the prior act, now provides that the
employer's liability shall be exclusively limited to the provisions of
the Act "in place of any and all other liability to the employee."
This limitation is extended by the Act to the employee's legal
representatives, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, or
anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action of law, or otherwise
on account of any injury or death as defined in the Act. This is termed
the employer-immunity doctrine.
This type of immunity has been confirmed by decisional law. See
Steets v. Sovereign Construction Co., 413 Pa. 458, 198 A.2d 590 (1964);
Svaus v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 214 Pa. Super. 595, 252 A.2d 646
(1969).
Immunity from tort liability under the Act is an affirmative
defense. Its pleading must be timely or a waiver may result. Turner
Construction Co. v. Hebner, 2276 Pa. Super. 341, 419 A.2d 488 (1980).
EXTENSION OF IMMUNITY TO FELLOW EMPLOYEES
Section 205, Act of August 24, 1963, P.L. 1175, 77 P.S., Sec. 72,
extended the employer's immunity from common-law action on account of the
employee's injury or death to any person who 'Was in the same employ as the
person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong." This is termed
co-employee or fellow-employee immunity.
In Babich Admx. v. Pavich et al., 270 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d
811 (1979), the court held that a full-time plant physician is immune
from a suit alleging that his medical negligence caused or contributed to
the compensable death of the worker employed by the same company.
In the recent case of Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co., 445 A.2d
811 (1962), the Superior Court held that physicians employed by the telephone
company were, for the purpose of determining tort immunity under the Act,
"fellow employees" of the injured telephone installer whom they treated. The
court further held that the phone company was acting as employer when the
alleged negligent treatment was committed by the physicians it employed,
and was not acting in a "dual capacity" in providing health care, such as
would permit the imposition of tort liability.
The Supreme Court allowed an appeal in this case on September 15,
1982, and affirmed the Superior Court on Dec. 7, 1983.
In the cases just discussed, the employees injured by the negligent
actions of the plant physicians still received workers' compensation benefits
for the aggravation of their original work injuries caused by the negligent
treatment. The effect of the fellow-workers immunity provision was the
foreclosure of the workers' right to bring malpractice tort actions against
the negligent physicians.
In addition to the cases dealing with treatment by "plant physicians"
who were deemed as co-employees, the extension of immunity to fellow employees
was judicially approved in Berger v. U.G.I. Corp. and City of Allentown, 285
Pa. Super. 374, 427 A.2d i1-(19TI), where the immunity was applied even
when the negligence of one autonomously operated city department causes
injury to an employee of a different city department.
If the injury was caused by an intentional personal attack
committed by a fellow employee, and is unrelated to the employment, that
injury is excluded from compensation coverage under the Act by the specific
provisions of Section 301(c) of the Act of October 17, 1972, P.L. 930, 77 P.S.
411. That section excludes from coverage "an injury caused by the act of
a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal
to him, and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his employ-
ment.1
Such an excluded injury can give rise to a common-law action by
the injured employee for the intentional tort against the tortfeasor, even
if he was a co-employee. See McBride v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 200 Pa.
Super. 347, 188 A.2d 775 (1963); and Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa. 114,
152 A.2d 887 (1959).
TORT ACTIONS AGAINST EMPLOYER
A. Failure to carry insurance
Under Section 305, Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, 77 P.S. 501,
the employee or dependents are given the right to sue the employer in tort
or to pursue a workers' compensation claim if the employer does not carry
insurance or has failed to qualify as a self-insurer.
To be successful in such a tort action, the employee must establish
that the employer was negligent. However, when such an action at law is
commenced, Section 201, Act of March 29, 1972, P.L. 172, 77 P.S., Sec. 41,
provides that the employer cannot invoke the common-law defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, or the negligence of a fellow servant, unless
it is established by the employer that the injury was caused by the worker's
intoxication or reckless indifference to danger.
Section 305 does not appear to put the employee to a strict
election of remedies, such that a fruitless tort action would bar a subsequent
compensation action. The majority rule appears to be that a choice of
what turns out to be a nonexistent remedy is no election at all. There
are no Pennsylvania cases on the effect of an election to sue in tort
or in workers' compensation, except for a prohibition against a double
recovery.
B. Injuries not included in the statute
(1) Occupational diseases not covered:
The cases have determined that common-law liability may be
imposed in certain occupational-disease claims, despite the exclusive-
remedy doctrine in the Act.
o In Perez v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 428 Pa. 425, 237
A.2d 227 (1968), Claimant was exposed to heavy dust produced in a grinding
operation, which, combined with injurious fumes caused by high temperatures
in his work place, caused an aggravation of his latent tubercular condition,
pulmonary emphysema, and severe bronchitis. Claimant sued in tort and re-
ceived a verdict. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the employer raised the
defense of the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict, holding that since claimant's diseases
were not specifically listed in the Act and did not meet the standards of
the omnibus provision in Section 108(n) of the Act, claimant's condition
was not covered by the Act and was therefore subject to a tort action.
o In Greer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 475 Pa. 448, 380 A.2d 1221 (1977),
the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, which had held that since
employee's pulmonary fibrosis was within the general purview of the Act, he
could not sue in tort. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that claimant
could not be deprived of his tort remedy until a factual finding is made that
claimant's pulmonary fibrosis was covered by the Occupational Disease Act
as an unspecified or unlisted disease, which is peculiar to the Claimant's
occupation by its cause and the characteristics of its manifestations -
that being the standard applied to unspecified diseases includable under
the Act's "omnibus clause." The case was remanded for that purpose.
o In Boniecke v. McGraw Edison Co., 252 Pa. Super. 461, 381 A.2d
1301 (1977), the Superior Court dealt with a case where claimant's pulmonary
fibrosis and bronchitis claim had been previously rejected by the referee
and the Workmen's Compensation Board as being noncompensable under the Act.
The Superior Court held that the earlier rejection by the compensation
authorities would not bar the tort claim made by the employee against his
employer based on the ground that employer improperly maintained his
premises and exposed him to hazards which caused him to contract pulmonary
fibrosis and bronchitis. This holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
401 A.2d 345 (1979).
(2) Work injuries that are not covered by the Act:
When work injuries, as distinguished from occupational diseases,
are involved, the courts seem to prohibit tort recovery more readily because
of the exclusive-remedy feature of the Act.
o In Scott v. C.E. Powell Co., 402 Pa. 73, 166 A.2d 31 (1960), the
court held that even though claimant's loss of sense of taste and smell were
not included as specific losses under the Act, the exclusive-remedy doctrine
barred any tort action against the employer. The court's position was
that since any disability and wage loss were compensable even if caused by
the loss of smell and taste, the compensability of this injury was within
the purview of the Act.
o In Kline v. Verner Co., 453 A.2d 1035 (1982), claimant received
injuries to his pelvic region which resulted in priapism, which is medically
defined as a persistent abnormal erection. He received disability compensa-
tion during the period he could not work, and then sued his employer in tort
for negligence, asserting that the loss of use of that particular organ was
not among the specific losses of parts of the body enumerated in Section 306(c)
of the Act.
The Superior Court rejected his suit, saying that when an employee
sustains a work injury compensable under the Act, the amount of compensation
depends solely upon the provisions of the Act, and that this kind, and
amount, of compensation is claimant's exclusive remedy.
Indistinguishing the different treatment accorded occupational
diseases, the court said: "The Occupational Disease Act, however, is not
analagous. It has application only to those diseases identified therein,
and was not intended to bar trespass actions brought upon diseases not
covered by the Act."
While there are no Pennsylvania cases on that subject, tort claims
for pain and suffering would also be barred, even though not covered by the
Act, because of the doctrine of exclusive-remedy.
(3) Injury caused by a third person due to non-work-related
animosity:
0 In Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, 421 A.2d 251 (1981), claimant
was assaulted by fellow employees because of personal malice. Claimant
received workmen's compensation and signed a final release. Claimant then
sued employer in tort for failure to maintain a safe work place. A verdict
against the employer was sustained on the theory that the employer could
have foreseen the violent acts by the co-employees against claimant because
of previous altercations and aggressive propensities of the co-employees.
The workers' compensation benefits received were credited against the tort
verdict to prevent a double recovery.
0 In Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959),
where an employee had been attacked by a fellow employee for personal reasons
not connected with his job, his claim for workers' compensation was not
covered by the Act. He was therefore free to sue his employer in tort if
he could prove an actionable claim against his employer.
(4) Injuries caused by employer operating in a "dual capacity":
Where an employer is also the manufacturer of a defective product
which causes injury to the employee, normally workers' compensation would
be the exclusive remedy for the employee injured in the course of his
employment. Several other states have developed a "dual capacity" doctrine
which would hold the employer liable in tort for the manufacture of the
defective product that caused the injury.
Since the employee may be able to recover much more in a common-
law products-liability action than in a compensation claim, this doctrine
is rapidly evolving in the courts. One of the basic arguments made in
support of the doctrine is that an employer cannot accept the benefits of
two positions and the liabilities of only one. Several cases have also
applied this doctrine to a "service" setting, as for example, a hospital
which also operates a public clinic.
Here are several of the leading cases, outside of Pennsylvania,
supporting the "dual capacity" doctrine:
0 Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 49 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137
Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). Plaintiff filed a suit against Gallo, his employer,
for personal injuries suffered when the scaffolding manufactured by the
employer, on which plaintiff was working, collapsed. The court upheld
the action, carefully limiting its decision to situations where the product
involved was for the sole use of the employer.
o Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E. 492
(1976). Here, claimant was a Uniroyal employee who was injured in a work-
related auto accident caused by the blowout of a defective tire manufactured
by his employer. Claimant's common-law action against his employer for its
defective product was allowed on the dual-capacity doctrine.
o Guy v. Arthur J. Thomas Co., 378 N.E. 2d 488 (Ohio 1978), after
an original compensable injury as an employee of the defendant-hospital,
plaintiff utilized employer's medical services, and then filed an action
for malpractice alleging the hospital negligently failed to diagnose her
condition, thereby aggravating her injury. Dismissal by the trial court
was reversed on appeal.
The court held that employer-hospital occupied a second or dual
capacity as an administering hospital in that it was both employer and
treating physician, and that, as a result of its second capacity, it had
obligations in tort unrelated to and independent of those imposed on it as
an employer.
o D'Angonia v. County of Los Angeles, 613 P.2d 238 (Cal. 1980).
The Supreme Court of California dealt with a physical therapist who was
employed at a county hospital. Claimant, while a patient, developed
gangrene which resulted in amputation of most of her toes and fingers.
Claimant received workers' compensation benefits and then sued the county
for negligent treatment.
The court allowed the action and stated that the rationale of
the dual-capacity decisions is that "if an injury arises from a relation-
ship which is distinct from that of employer and employee and invokes a
different set of obligations than the employer's duties to its employee,
there is no justification for shielding the employer from liability at
common law."
Since then, the "dual capacity" doctrine has been severely limited
by the California legislature.
o McDaniel v. Sage, 419 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind. 1981). An employee,
being treated at a company infirmary, sued in tort for an injury caused
by improper injection by the company nurse. It was held that the nurse's
liability arose from her nurse-patient relationship with employee, and
not from the employer-employee relationship, which the compensation act was
designed to regulate. The court concluded that the nurse was acting as an
independent contractor, and that the employee's action against her was not
barred by statutory employer-immunity.
o Robard v. Est. of Kantzler, 296 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. 1980). The
employee injured his hand in a machine which his employer leased from
another corporation of which his employer was the sole officer and share-
holder. The employee sued the lending corporation in tort and was met
with the defense of co-employee immunity. The court held that employee's
tort claim is not barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act because the
lending corporation is subject to the same liabilities as any other lessor
who provides a defective product, regardless of the intercorporate relation-
ship.
When we consider the Pennsylvania law, we find two cases on the
dual-capacity doctrine which appear to be in conflict with each other.
0 Tatrai v. Presbyterian University Hospital, 497 Pa. 247, 439
A.2d 1162 (1982). Here, a hospital employee became ill and was sent to the
public emergency room for treatment, where the employee was injured through
the negligent maintenance of an x-ray table. The Supreme Court held, with-
out mentioning "dual capacity," that the employee could sue in tort and
was not barred by the exclusive-remedy doctrine. The concurring opinion
allowed the action on the ground that the employee was in the same position
in the emergency room as a member of the public, and was owed by the same
legal responsibility by the hospital.
o Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co., 445 A.2d 811 (1982). Here,
the Superior Court held that where the employer had a clinic for its
employees, and not for the general public, that an injury or malpractice upon
the injured worker at that clinic did not give rise to a tort liability
action against the employer because of the exclusive-remedy provisions of
the Act. The court specifically mentions the "dual capacity" doctrine but
rejects its application in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior
Court on Dec. 7, 1983.
o In another related case, Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 522 Fed.
Supp. 1070 (1981), a panel of U.S. District Judges for the eastern district
of Pennsylvania concluded that as a federal court bound by Pennsylvania
law, they found no justification for concluding that the appellate courts
of Pennsylvania had, or would, adopt the dual-capacity doctrine in a
products-liability setting.
For Pennsylvania lower-court cases on this subject, see Harris
v. Uniontown Hosp., 72 D. & C. 2d 132 (1975) (tort action for negligent
treatment of injured hospital employee); and Cherneskie v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 70 D. & C. 2d 605 (1974) (injured employee forced to return to work
before full recovery, and who aggravated injury, was permitted to sue
employer in tort)
(5) Claims for other intentional torts against the employer:
The following cases cover a variety of tort actions against
employers in several other jurisdictions. These states may not have the
same stringent exclusive-remedy and immunity doctrines as does Pennsylvania.
Therefore, these cases should be carefully examined in light of the par-
ticular statutory language of that state.
o Action based on fraudulent concealment of unsafe workplace:
In Johns Manville, et al. v. Contra Costa, etc., 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980),
the employer was held liable in a common-law action for aggravation of a
worker's disease, upon proof that the employer knowingly ordered the
employee to work in an unsafe environment, concealing the risk from him,
and, after the employee had contracted an industrial disease (asbestosis),
deliberately failed to notify the state, the employer, or doctors treat-
ing him of the disease and its connection with his employment.
o Action based on intentional acts by the employer: In Doney v.
Tambouratgis, 140 Cal.Rep. 782 (1979), plaintiff was employed as a topless-
bottomless dancer in defendant's bar. One night after closing, plaintiff
was invited into defendant's office to discuss a customer's complaint.
When she arrived, defendant asked her to remove her clothes. She refused,
defendant wrestled her to the floor, where they struggled, and defendant
assaulted her. Plaintiff brought a tort action, but the employer pleaded
that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was in worker's compensation. The court
dismissed the defense, and allowed the tort action because plaintiff's
injury did not arise in the course of her employment.
0 Separate tort claims by relatives: In Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connells' Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980), the court held that
the Workmen's Compensation Act does not bar common-law recovery by the
spouse and dependent minor children of an injured employee for their
claims against a negligent employer for loss of consortium or familial
relationship, or for the mental distress and resulting physical injuries.
In this case, the injured worker was also receiving workers' compensation
benefits.
In Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736 (Texas 1981), the
Texas Supreme Court held that while a spouse cannot recover a consortium
claim for gross negligence, or negligence, on the part of the employer,
the Workmen's Compensation Act does not destroy an action by the spouse
for loss of consortium for employer's intentional act. Because this
claim was the spouse's separate property, the husband's acceptance of
workers' compensation benefits did not bar spouse's suit for intentional
impairment of consortium.
Pennsylvania's immunity doctrine would probably preclude consortium
claims.
o Action based on safety inspections or OSHA violations: In
Sewell v. Bathely Mfq. Co., 303 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 1981), the Michigan
Supreme Court held that employer's conduct which violated the state occu-
pational safety and health act was actionable only under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, no matter how reprehensible the alleged misconduct on the
part of the employer might be.
0 Claims for malicious prosecution, defamation, and violations
of civil rights: In Faley v. Polaroid Corp., 409 N.E.2d 1300 (Mass. 1980),
the employee was unjustly accused of assault and rape on a fellow employee
and his prosecution was aided by the employer. After acquittal, the
employee sued in tort for intentional mental distress (held not actionable
because covered by the compensation act), defamation of character (held
actionable in tort because it was an injury to reputation irrespective of
physical harm), and civil-rights violation (held actionable because it was
not an injury covered by the compensation act).
0 Wrongful-death statute claims: In Ary v. Missouri Portland
Cement Co., 612 S.E.2d 840 (Mo. 1981), the Missouri Court found that
workers' compensation benefits were the sole remedy available to the heirs
of the claimant who was killed in a mining accident. When the workmen's
compensation law is applicable it is the complete surrogate for any other
liability of the employer. Not only is the employer released from common-
law liability, but other specific statutory liability as well.
o Action based on retaliatory discharge for filing claims: In
Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (N.J. 1981), the
court held that a worker has a common-law right of action for wrongful dis-
charge based upon an alleged retal iatoryfiring which followed his filing a
workers' compensation claim.
In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 NE.2d 425, (Ind. 1973),
claimant received compensation for her injured arm during her four-month
disability. Fifteen months later she realized that she had a claim for
30 percent loss of use and filed a specific-loss claim, which was settled.
One month later, she was fired without a given reason. She brought suit
for retaliatory discharge, and the case was permitted to go to trial for
actual and punitive damages.
TORT ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE CARRIERS
A. Statutory immunity for carriers
Section 305 of the Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, 77 P.S.,
Sec. 501, which requires every employer to carry insurance, or to be validly
self-insured, also provides that "such insurer (carrier) shall assume the
employer's liability hereunder and shall be entitled to all cof the employer's
immunities and protection hereunder...." This section resolves the confusion
created in cases involving the direct liability of an insurance carrier
in tort claims filed by the employee. See DeJesus v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 439 Pa. 180, 268 A.2d 924 (19701; Brown v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 434 Pa. 507, 254 A.2d 27 (1969); Leonard v. Harris Corp. et al.,290
Pa. Super. 370, 434 A.2d 798 (1981); and Doane v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
266 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
An insurance carrier has no immunity for the negligence of the
providers of medical treatment directed and controlled by the insurance
carrier, since this medical treatment is a separate and distinct function
of the insurance carrier that does not concern the employer and is not part
of the employer's business operations. See Tropiano v. The Travelers
Insurance Co. et a., 455 Pa. 360, 319 A.2d 426 (1974). This does not affect
the immunity of the employer from tort actions for negligent treatment by
plant physicians or a dispensary. (See Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co.,
supra.)
B. Case law on tort actions against insurance carriers
(1) Actions for non-physical-injury torts:
In Reed v. Hartford Acc. & Inc. Co., 367 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Penna.
1973), a Pennsylvania case, Plaintiff had incurred a compensable injury nd
made an agreement with the carrier calling for payment of total disability
benefits. In October, 1969, the carrier stopped the payments but did not
file a petition to terminate or modify the agreement until June, 1971. In
November, 1971, a hearing was held, at which medical experts on both sides
testified that the plaintiff was still totally disabled.
Plaintiff brought a tort action against the carrier based on four
charges: intentional imposition by the carrier of economic duress on
plaintiff in order to force a settlement for less than compensation for
total disability, conversion of funds set aside for the benefit of the
plaintiff, misuse and abuse of process, and breach of the workers' compensa-
tion agreement, The court held that the actions for intentional wrongs
and Lreach of agreement were not barred by the exclusive-remedy clause of
the compensation act.
(2) Actions alleging that carrier was acting in bad faith:
In Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220 (Wis.
1979), it was held that where a workers' compensation insurer acts in bad
faith in settlement or payment of compensation benefits, a separate tort
is not within purview of exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation
law, and a separate tort action for bad faith may be aileged and relief
provided by the court. There are no Pennsylvania cases on this subject.
(3) Actions for negligent performance of safety inspections:
In Johnson v. Amer. Mutual Ins. Co., 394 So.2d I (Ala. 1981), the
Supreme Court Alabama held that a statute immunizing an insurance
carrier and its employees when negligently performing safety inspections
is unconstitutional because it deprives an injured worker of his right to
due process.
In Leonard v. Harris Corp. et al., 434 A.2d 798 (Pa. 1981), the
court held that the injured worker had no common-la reiedy against the
compensation carrier that negligently conducted safety inspections of the
plant and machines where the claimant was injured while working. The court
cited Sec. 305 of the Act to support its holding.
(4) Claim for infliction of mental anguish:
In Stafford v. West Chester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska
1974), claimant asked for, among other things, damages for conscious
infliction of mental injury by the insurance carrier. He alleged that
the carrier, through its agents, willfully, deliberately, and maliciously
withheld compensation benefits in an effort to discourage him from pro-
ceeding for compensation under the Act. The trial court granted summary
judgment for defendant on this point, chiefly on the ground that, since
the Act contained a specific penalty for delay in making compensation pay-
ments, that penalty was the exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court reversed,
and remanded the case for trial on this point.
THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS
When a compensable injury is the result of a third person's tor-
tious conduct, the Pennsylvania act preserves a right of action against the
tortfeasor, since the compensation system was not designed to extend
immunity to other than employers or claimant's co-employees.
Section 303(b) of the Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, 77 P.S.,
Sec 481(b), provides that when employee's injury or death is caused by a
third party, his "legal representatives, husband or wife, parents, dependents
or next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled . . . may bring their action
at law against such third party . . ." (emphasis added).
Therefore, injured workers can bring tort actions, in addition to
their workers' compensation claims, against any other third person whose
negligence causes or contributes to their injuries or to the development
of their occupational disease.
Such third-party actions can be brought against: (1) manufacturers
or sellers of defective or hazardous machineiy, services, or other products
used by workers (called products-liability suits); (2) general contractors
on jobs where the employee was employed by a sub-contractor; (3) owners of
property on which employees are performing work; (0) physicians who are
negligent in their treatment (medical malpractice); and (5) manufacturers
or sellers of defective or hazardous substances, chemicals or services
used in the workplace.
As an example of such a third-party action, the injured worker
may sue an equipment manufacturer while using a product which malfunctions,
is unsafely designed, or is unsafe because the manufacturer fails to give
proper instructions for using the product. The worker must show that the
defect existed when the product left the manufacturer's hands and that the
defect was the cause of the injury.
One of the key questions in a products-liability lawsuit is whether
the manufacturer could have designed his equipment differently, or could
have provided additional safety devices to prevent the worker's injury. If
he could have done so but failed to do it, the manufacturer can be held
liable for the worker's injury.
In connection with injury from toxic substances, the injured
worker must establish that the manufacturer or seller of the substance knew,
or should have known, of its dangerous effect on health, and that it failed
to warn users or handlers of the specific dangers associated with the use of
its product.
Of course, the classic third-party actions are against negligent
operators of autos who cause injury to a worker while he or she is driving
or walking during the course of his employment.
Third-party tort actions must be filed within two years from the
date of the injury, or from the time that the injured employee knew or
should have known that he suffered from physical harm which was related to his
employment.
Needless to say, awards in tort actions can be several times the
amount paid in workers' compensation benefits, since damage items include
full loss of salary, pain and suffering and mental anguish damages, loss of
consortium, and possible loss of future earnings.
SUBROGATION RIGHTS CREATED BY THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS
To avoid double recovery by the injured employee from both
workers' compensation and a third-party recovery, Sec. 319 (Act of March 29,
1972 P.L. 159, 77 P.S., Sec. 671) provides that the employer shall be
subrogated to the right of the employee or his dependents, against such
third party to the extent of the compensation payable, with certain stated
proration of attorney's fees and costs. This right applies to either a
recovery or compromise settlement. Of course, any excess over the sub-
rogated amount is payable to the employee.
There have been several important decisions concerning the
application of the subrogation provisions of Sec. 319, the following of
which are deemed significant:
130
0 In spite of the language of the first paragraph of Sec. 319,
77 P.S., Sec. 671, stating that the employer is subrogated, where the
aorkers' compensation carrier has. paid benefits, it is the carrier and
not the employer who is subrogated to the employee's rights against the
third party. Brown v. Travelers Insurance Co., 434 Pa. 507, 254 A.2d 27
(1969); Rehrer v. Service Trucking Company, 112 F. Supp. 24 (D. Del., 1953).
0 Where the employee sues a third-party tortfeasor, then the
employer (or carrier) is entitled to reimbursement of compensation paid to
date, and a credit against future compensation payable, reduced by the
employer's pro rata share of legal fees and expenses. Bumbarger v.
Bumbarger, 190 Pa. Super. 571, 155 A.2d 216 (1959).
o There is no right to subrogation to the carrier for sums
awarded children under the Wrongful Death Act where the widow brings a
survival and wrongful-death action against the tortfeasor. The carrier is
entitled to subrogation of only the widow's recovery, not the children's,
because the children had no separate cause of action against the employer
under the Act. Anderson v. Borough of Greenville, 442 Pa. 11, 273 A.2d 512
(1971).
o The employer (or its carrier) is obligated to pay a pro rata
share of counsel fees and expenses which were incurred in producing the
third-party settlement or verdict. The employer must pay the legal fees
and expenses on that part of the recovery that reimburses the employer
for compensation already paid, or that constitutes a credit for the
employer against compensation payable in the future. See Wall v. Conn.
Welding & Machine Co., 197 Pa. Super. 360, 179 A.2d 235 (1962); and
So v. Hires Turner Glass Company, 187 Pa. Super. 44, 142 A.2d 425
0 The employer is entitled to be subrogated to the total recov-
ery of the employee against a third party. No allocation of any part of
the recovery by agreement or verdict to losses not covered by the Act, such
as pain and suffering, can reduce the subrogation interest of the employer
in the recovery. Bumbarger v. Bumbarger, 190 Pa. Super. 571, 155 A.2d
216 (1959).
o Although the employer has a subrogation interest in the
employee's cause of action against the third-party tortfeasor, only the
employee is the proper party to enforce or control the action. See
:London Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Reid, 156 F.Supp. 897 (E.D.
Pa. 1957) .,
The Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Act of
July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, 40 P.S., Sec. 1009.101 et seq., was originally
construed as abolishing the subrogation right of the employer under
Sec. 319 against a third party in an auto-accident case where non-economic
benefits were claimed under the No-fault Act. See Brunelli v. Farrelly,
226 Pa. Super. 29, 402 A.2d i061 (1979).
However, the Supreme Court has recently held, in Vespeziano v.
Insana, 462 A.2d 669 (1983), that where an injured employee received
wage-loss benefits under both the No-fault Act and the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, of which the amount over $31,000 was paid by the workers'
compensation carrier, the subrogation claimof the compensation carrier
was negated under the No-fault Act only to the extent of those benefits
paid by the carrier that constituted contribution toward compensation of
the first $15,000 of work loss-sustained.
However, beyond the carrier's contribution toward that first
$15,000 of compensation, the subrogation claim for recovery of benefits
payable is not affected by the No-fault Act and may be recovered by the
compensation carrier. Since the carriers' contribution to the workers'
wage loss is generally limited to two-thirds of that loss, the only portion
of the subrogation claim which is negated by the No-fault Act amounts to
two-thirds of $15,000 or $10,000 on a net basis.
On the effect of the Comparative Negligence Act on the apportion-
ment of liability and damages, between one or more third-party tortfeasors
and the plaintiffs employer, the recent case of Heckendorn v. Consolidated
Rail Cor2. et M., decided on September 15, 1983, by the Supreme Court in
65 A.2d 609, finally puts this question to rest.
In this case, plaintiff worked for the Carnation Company and
filed a tort action for injuries against Consolidated Rail Corp. and Evans
Products as third parties who caused his injuries. Conrail attempted to
join the employer as an additional defendant, citing the Comparative
Negligence Act as authority for the joinder.
The common pleas court and Superior Court sustained the employer's
preliminary objections under the provisions of Sec. 303(b) of the compensa-
tion act. This section specifically prohibits such a joinder.
The Supreme Court affirmed the prohibition of the joinder for
these reasons:
o The Comparative Negligence Act does not permit any apportion-
ment between one or more third-party tortfeasors and the employer.
o No involuntary joinder of the employer as either defendant or
plaintiff is permitted in an action by an employee against a third-party
tortfeasor; and
0 The employer's subrogation rights may not be challenged by an
allegation that the employer was partially responsible for the worker's
injury, and the issue of employer's negligence is irrelevant.
SUMMARY
Since Pennsylvania is considered a strong adherent to the exclusive-
remedy and employer's-immunity doctrines, the attempts to erode these
doctrines have not met with great success in this state.
The only areas where the decisional law has supported.the allow-
ance of tort actions. for damages by employees against their employers, are
the cases concerning certain uncovered occupational diseases, and assaults
or other tortious conduct by the employer. As to the 'dual capacity"
tort actions against the employer, they would seem to be barred in a
products-liability situation but may be allowed in a service setting,
as characterized by the hospital cases.
Tort actions against co-employees or carriers are generally
barred by a statutory extension to them of the immunity doctrine, with
certain exceptions for tortlous conduct by co-employees based on personal
animosity or negligent medical care for insurance carriers.
